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Capitalism, bureaucratic 
authoritarianism, and prospects for 
democracy in the United States 
Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe 
David Collier, ed. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979. 
Richard R. Fagen, ed. Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American 
Relations. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979. 
One of the fruits of U.S. hegemony in the postwar years was the 
emergence of a dominant perspective in the social sciences of the 1950s and 
early 1960s that had optimistic expectations concerning economic prosperity 
and political democracy throughout the world. Loosely organized around 
Parsonian structural functionalism, two substantive wings of this perspec-
tive took shape: the theory of industrial society and the theory of modern-
ization, one for the developed portions of the world and one for the devel-
oping areas. The division was predicated upon a series of fundamental 
contrasts-traditional vs. modem, rural vs. urban, agricultural vs. indus-
trial, sacred vs. secular-a number of which were restated as the Parsonian 
pattern variables (ascription vs. achievement, particularism vs. univer-
salism, etc.). 1 
We would like to thank a number of people for their criticisms of earlier drafts: Morris 
Blachman, Peter Evans, Gary Gereffi, Louis Goodman, David Martin, Richard Newfarmer, 
Richard Valelly, and the editors of International Organization. 
1 Anthony Giddens, '' Classical Social Theory and the Origins of Modem Sociology,'' Ameri-
lnternational Organization 36,3, Summer 1982 
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634 International Organization 
The theory of industrial society holds, in essence, that the level of de-
velopment of a given society is set by the unfolding of certain inter-related 
technological and economic processes which carry the society from tradition 
to modernity. This unfolding is seen, for the most part, as endogenously or 
domestically driven; external or international factors constitute at most an 
"environment" to which the society adapts. Moreover, the state is por-
trayed as having little to do with making these changes: it is portrayed as 
subordinate to society. 2 
The theory of modernization drew its image of the goal of development 
from the theory of industrial society: developing countries should emulate 
the most developed ones. "Both material benefits (capital and technology) 
and cultural patterns (institutions and values) were to be diffused or spread 
from the developed to the underdeveloped countries, and within each un-
derdeveloped nation from the modem to the traditional sectors. " 3 
Of central importance to us here is what these twin theories had to say 
about prospects for democracy. In the underdeveloped countries a gradual 
progression toward democracy was anticipated as modernization produced 
literacy, better communications, and rising standards of living-the cultural 
and economic preconditions for democracy. 4 Because those preconditions 
were already realized, or nearly so, in industrial societies, there was a pre-
vailing optimism about the prospects for democracy in the U.S., in Europe, 
and in other developed countries. The concern, widely voiced before World 
War II, that there might be tension or conflict between democracy and 
capitalism slipped from view; indeed, "capitalism" ceased to be spoken ofat 
all. 
Modernization theory is now in eclipse5 and nowhere more so than in 
Latin America, where "development" has brought to some countries au-
can Journal of Sociology 81 (1976), pp. 703-729. See also Gary Gereffi," 'Wonder Drugs' and 
Transnational Corporations in Mexico: An Elaboration and a Limiting-Case Test of De-
pendency Theory" (Ph.D. diss., Department of Sociology, Yale University, 1980), chap. 1, 
parts III and IV. 
2 Giddens, "Classical Social Theory," pp. 718-21. On the theory of industrial society, see, 
for example, Raymond Aron, 18 Lectures on Industrial Society (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1%2); and Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1964). 
3 Gereffi, " 'Wonder Drugs' in Mexico," p. 51. On the theory of modernization, see, for 
example, Marion Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1966); and David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1965). 
4 See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Eco-
nomic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53 (1959), 
pp. 69-105; Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1960); and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: 
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963). 
5 Among many critiques, see Immanuel Wallerstein, "Modernization: Requiescat in Pace," 
in The Capitalist World Economy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 132-37; and 
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics," 
Comparative Politics 3 (1971), pp. 283-322. 
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Capitalism, authoritarianism, and democracy 635 
thoritarian regimes that engage in repression and deny democratic rights 
more deliberately and systematically than ever before. Alternative perspec-
tives to replace modernization theory-most notably the dependency 
perspective-have, for the most part, been elaborated in Latin America and 
"diffused" to the United States. 6 Optimism about the realization of democ-
racy has been replaced by perceptions that stress the obstacles to demo-
cratic regimes that arise from the tensions and stresses of delayed indus-
trialization within the world capitalist system. 
In the industrialized countries-which have, for the most part, so far 
been spared episodes of authoritarianism since World War II-there is once 
again emerging the concern that capitalism and democracy may be uneasy 
bedfellows. Charles E. Lindblom, for example, has recently become con-
cerned about the undermining of political equality that flows from the inher-
ently "privileged position of business" in polyarchies.7 There is a distinc-
tively primitive quality to this concern as it is now being voiced. In 1978 
Commentary solicited twenty-six responses to the question of the compati-
bility of democracy with capitalism from scholars across the ideological 
spectrum.8 Two positions (positions that are really faces of the same coin) 
dominated the symposium. On the one hand it was argued that capitalism 
creates bases of power distinct from the state, which serve as a bulwark 
against any creep toward authoritarianism. On the other hand it was argued 
that capitalism creates concentrations of private power that constantly 
undermine the achievement of political equality. What is simplistic in these 
formulations is that they approach the matter as if there were some sort of 
essential character to capitalism that biased it for or against democracy 
rather than viewing capitalism as a dynamic process that may give rise to 
conditions fortuitous for the flowering of democracy in some times and 
places and to conditions that undermine it in others. A number of Commen-
tary's contributors warn that no general causal connection can be estab-
lished. Theodore Draper, for example, argues that "the question of 
capitalism and democracy cannot be dealt with in the abstract; it always 
raises other questions-what capitalism? where? when? in what politi-
cal culture and tradition?" 9 But none of the other contributors suggests 
any useful answers to Draper's questions. The debate is stuck on claims and 
counterclaims about private and plural centers of power: a static, abstract 
approach. 10 
6 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United 
States," Latin American Research Review 12 (1977), pp. 7-24. 
• Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 161-233. 
8 "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy; A Symposium," Commentary, April 1978, pp. 
29-71. 
9 Ibid., p. 37. 
10 Two other recent attempts promise a more dynamic and historical approach, but neither 
really succeeds. Robert Dahl traces a sequence of commitments made by the U.S., and notes a 
contradiction between the commitment to democracy made in the early 19th century and the 
commitment to corporate capitalism made in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; but 
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Two recent edited volumes, both sponsored by the Social Science Re-
search Council's Joint Committee on Latin American Studies, and both 
drawing upon perspectives that have developed in Latin America in opposi-
tion to modernization theory, cast fresh light on questions of capitalism, the 
state, and democracy .11 The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, edited 
by David Collier, focuses upon the harshly repressive, authoritarian regimes 
that have arisen in the last two decades in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay. All of the essays focus on whether this "new authoritarianism" is 
best seen as a response to the economic dislocations that arise at a particular 
stage of dependent or peripheral capitalism. Capitalism and the State in 
U.S.-Latin American Relations, edited by Richard Fagen, is a more sprawl-
ing but also a more exploratory collection. It seeks to grasp the "deep 
sources" and the consequences of actions taken in the hemisphere by U.S.-
based institutions, both public and private. In tracing the changing relation-
ship between capitalism and the state in the hemisphere, a number of the 
essays probe the question of democracy in inter-American relations and in 
the United States itself. 
In focusing upon what these two volumes have to offer on the question 
of capitalism and democracy, what emerges most clearly is that because 
capitalism operates on a global scale, the question of capitalism and democ-
racy must be seen as a question of international political economy. There is a 
methodological lesson to be learned as well: the "historical structural" ap-
proach employed by all the authors in the Collier volume and by many in the 
Fagen volume contrasts sharply with the dominant methodology of North 
capitalism and democracy are still conceptualized abstractly; see "On Removing Certain Im-
pediments to Democracy in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 92 (1977), pp. 1-20. 
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis argue that "the internal dynamics" of advanced capitalist 
societies "tend to undermine the necessary conditions for both capitalism and liberal democ-
racy," and that "the necessary conditions for the long run reproduction of liberal capitalist 
society are contradictory." But their analysis does not in fact investigate how this contradiction 
manifests itself in concrete historical situations; see "The Invisible Fist: Have Capitalism and 
Democracy Reached a Parting of the Ways?" American Economic Review 68 (May 1978), pp. 
358-63. More to be recommended is Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Con-
tradictions of Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1977). 
11 The JCLAS (one of ten joint committees of the Social Science Research Council and the 
American Council of Learned Societies) makes pre- and post-doctoral individual research 
grants, but it also sponsors research planning projects-working groups of scholars conducting 
research in new directions-that frequently, as in these two instances, produce edited volumes. 
Since its founding in 1959, the JCLAS (whose funding has come principally from the Ford, 
Andrew W. Mellon, and Tinker Foundations) has had a major role in shaping the directions of 
research and scholarship about Latin America. It has, for example, nurtured the critique of 
modernization theory and the formulation of the dependency approach and its offshoots. On 
this topic and on others, the composition of the JCLAS-it includes eminent scholars from 
Latin America and Europe as well as from the U.S.A.-has affected the orientation of the 
research it sponsors. Modernization theory was home-grown in the U.S.; the dependency ap-
proach was first formulated by Latin Americans but scholars from Europe and North America 
have contributed to its elaboration and revision. It would be difficult to overstate the importance 
of the JCLAS in fostering high-quality, incisive research on Latin America, but its cross-
fertilization of North and South American approaches in the social sciences has generated 
perspectivas that warrant the attention of a much wider scholarly audience. 
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American social science. It makes possible a discussion of the relationship of 
capitalism and democracy that avoids the abstract, ahistorical, and implicitly 
deterministic approach that has characterized recent discussions of this 
question in the United States. In the first section of this essay we look at the 
contribution of these two volumes to an understanding of the relationship 
between capitalism and democracy in Latin America. In the second section 
we suggest ways that these essays and the historical structural approach help 
broach the question of prospects for democracy in the United States. These 
prospects are not altogether unclouded. 
1. The new authoritarianism in Latin America 
The hopes of the 1950s and 1960s for a gradual democratization of Latin 
America, the hopes of modernization theory and of the Alliance for Prog-
ress, were dashed by the coming of a host of authoritarian regimes unlike 
those that had characterized the past in Latin America. At first, the Brazilian 
coup of 1964 seemed like an isolated, unique event and the regime that it 
installed something to be referred to the peculiarities of Brazil. But with 
Argentina falling under military rule in 1966, then Chile and Uruguay in 1973, 
and finally Argentina once again in 1976 after three years of civilian rule, it 
became clear that a more general pattern required explanation. 
Despite considerable variation in the circumstances that brought the 
military to power, these new regimes shared four characteristics that set 
them apart from military governments of the past. First, they are less per-
sonalistic; the military rules as an institution. Moreover, the military does 
not seek to justify its rule as something temporary, while order is restored, 
before "normal" democratic politics resume. Rather, the military seeks a 
profound restructuring of society. Second, these regimes are technocratic in 
orientation. They justify their rule in terms of instrumental rationality-the 
rationality of bureaucracies and of the market. Third, these regimes pursue 
economic growth on a strategy that encourages private investment, both 
domestic and foreign, and that relies, to an unusually high degree, on market 
mechanisms. Fourth, and finally, these regimes actively pursue the de-
mobilization of the lower classes, to induce political quietude through re-
pression and terror. Thus, these regimes are a chilling combination of bru-
tality and rationality. 
Among various attempts to explain the rise of new military regimes in 
Latin America, a general thesis put forward by Guillermo O'Donnell rapidly 
captured center stage, particularly because it synthesized a number of 
strands of recent research concerning dependency, corporatism, populism, 
and import-substituting industrialization. 12 The New Authoritarianism in 
12 For O'Donnell's successive formulations see Modernization and Bureaucratic Au-
thoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 
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Latin America, edited by David Collier, contains essays by eight distin-
guished Latin American scholars, essays that seek to critique, revise, ex-
tend, and elaborate this thesis concerning what O'Donnell has labeled "bu-
reaucratic authoritarian" (or B-A) regimes. 
Stated in its most general form, the O'Donnell thesis follows familiar 
enough lines. Economic crisis, in the form of stagnant growth and rising 
inflation, spawns social and political crisis. Reacting to what they perceive 
to be a threat from the left, key elites in the public and private sectors arrive 
at a consensus that an authoritarian solution is necessary to break the stale-
mate and to forestall the possibility of revolution. What makes the O'Don-
nell thesis compelling is its attempt, first, to identify the particular character 
of the underlying crisis, an identification that groups together a number of 
otherwise diverse Latin American countries; second, to identify the con-
straints that delimit possible avenues of resolution of the crisis; and third, to 
identify the specific coalitions that may form around specific avenues of 
resolution. 
More specifically, O'Donnell argues that in Latin America capitalist in-
dustrialization has tended to proceed along the lines of import substitution, 
beginning with consumer nondurable products of simple technology and low 
capital requirements (e.g., paper, textiles, shoes), moving next to products 
requiring more sophisticated technology and larger capital investments, and 
then to consumer durable manufacture (automobiles, appliances) and to 
capital goods. This pattern of industrialization was initiated, in large part, 
after changes in the world capitalist system, particularly the collapse of 
world trade during the Depression, undermined the earlier economic stage of 
primary product exports. Once begun, import-substituting industrialization 
was found to have an internal dynamic that propelled it forward. But this 
import substitution occasioned no reduction in balance-of-payments prob-
lems, only a change in the composition of the import bill as intermediate and 
capital goods replaced consumer products. 
The character of industrialization in the early or ''easy'' stage of import 
substitution conditioned the character of political regimes. On the one hand, 
industrialization created an urban working class; on the other hand, produc-
tion for domestic consumption required an expansion of the domestic mar-
ket. A coalition of urban workers and national entrepreneurs spawned 
populist regimes: Vargas in Brazil, the Popular Front in Chile, Peron in 
University of California, 1973); "Corporatism and the Quest of the State,'' in James M. Malloy, 
ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1977); and "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic Authoritarian 
State," Latin American Research Review 12, 1 (Winter 1978), pp. 3-38. For strands upon which 
he drew, see, for example, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and 
Development in Latin America (1971; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Albert 0. 
Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin Amer-
ica," in Bias for Hope (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 85-123; and Philippe 
Schmitter, "Paths to Political Development in Latin America," in Douglas A. Chalmers, ed., 
Changing Latin America (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1972), pp. 83-108. 
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Argentina. By the late 1940s or early 1950s, many of these regimes had a 
more or less democratic character-popularly elected governments or com-
petitive elites. 
The "easy stage" of import substitution began to exhaust itself in the 
mid 1950s, however: opportunities for small-scale investment in consumer 
nondurables or in industries putting final touches on consumer durables 
(e.g., auto assembly from imported kits) were diminishing. Further expan-
sion was perceived to depend on large-scale investment in the manufacture 
of consumer durables or in capital goods. The requisites of such massive 
capital accumulation exacerbated conflicts that could no longer be contained 
by these relatively open regimes. Needs for fiscal austerity, labor discipline, 
and long-term predictability began to threaten the interests of the domestic 
bourgeoisie, white-collar consumers, and blue-collar workers that had 
formed the basis of these "national populist" coalitions. Political stalemate 
ensued, transforming economic difficulties into sociopolitical crises. Bu-
reaucratic authoritarian regimes emerged to settle by coercion the problems 
that could not be settled through bargaining and negotiation. 
The various contributors to The New Authoritarianism in Latin 
America all, in one way or another, address the O'Donnell thesis concern-
ing the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. Some offer theoretical 
critiques, others empirical disproof; some revise or refashion it, others ex-
tend it "to new cases. All the pieces are interesting and sophisticated, but as a 
whole the book presents a dense, barely penetrable thicket of argumentation 
to any reader not already quite familiar with its concerns. O'Donnell's thesis 
has not been widely available in English, and it has passed through several 
revisions. David Collier gives a summary overview of the argument at the 
beginning but the historical material needed by anyone not a specialist in the 
region is only encountered in Robert Kaufman's chapter, over halfway into 
the book. Moreover, the delimitation of individual chapters is curious. It is 
clear that the contributors shared a sense of what were the important issues 
to discuss, but these issues are seldom the clear central focus of specific 
pieces. The editor's Introduction and Conclusion struggle valiantly to keep 
these issues in view. Finally, and perhaps most confusingly, there is a coun-
terpunching sense to the book. It does not seem that anyone is defending the 
O'Donnell thesis. O'Donnell himself has a chapter in the volume, but it is 
concerned with extending his analysis to treat the dynamics of B-A regimes 
once installed rather than with explaining their emergence. Despite Collier's 
attempt to draw the pieces together, a reader might conclude that the thesis 
was being thoroughly rejected. 13 While some of the thesis's major proposi-
13 Thus, for example, this conclusion from a recent review: "Enough evidence is marshalled 
in this rather large volume to lead most observers to seriously question many of its central 
assumptions. Perhaps most importantly, the close linkage between the above-mentioned eco-
nomic problems and the emergence of B-A regimes is refuted by several of the papers." See 
Mitchell Seligson's review of The New Authoritarianism in Latin America in American Politi-
cal Science Review 74 (1980), pp. 1107-8. 
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tions do not stand up to empirical test, this aura of disconfirmation serves to 
obscure a deeper common perspective shared among all the authors con-
cerning the political economy ofregime transitions. Before summarizing this 
deeper common perspective, let us discuss some of the key issues in conten-
tion in the book. 
The first that merits attention is the question of populism. Kaufman's 
lengthy review of the history of the countries that have experienced B-A 
regimes leads him to the conclusion that populist regimes are not as tightly 
associated with the easy stage of import-substituting industrialization as 
O'Donnell indicates. This phase of industrialization is compatible with a va-
riety of political regimes. But the next stage of industrialization, Kaufman 
agrees, after import substitution encounters exhaustion, does entail a radical 
narrowing of the range of choice in political regimes: "variations in the 
structure of the state began to make more of an economic difference-
particularly the capacity of the state to insulate economic decision-making 
from populist pressures" (p. 203). This is when B-A regimes make their en-
trance. In his concluding chapter, Collier offers the suggestion that populism 
be seen as a background variable: the likelihood and severity of B-A rule 
correlates with the strength and independence of populism. 
Second is the issue of ''deepening.'' A number of the contributors pre-
sent evidence that the economic crisis which precipitates a B-A coup is not 
invariably brought on by the requisites of deepening import substitution (the 
achievement of a higher degree of vertical integration of the productive 
structure). There are other policy options by which to continue indus-
trialization, and in some cases deepening was neither tried nor perceived. 
Jose Serra examines the Brazilian case with some care and concludes that 
something like the reverse of deepening was occurring on the eve of the B-A 
coup, and that the military junta did undertake deepening but not until the 
1970s. Robert Kaufman identifies a number of alternative economic growth 
strategies that could have been pursued-alternatives to deepening such as 
exports of manufactured goods or primary products, or income redistribu-
tion to widen the internal market. Moreover, "none of these strategies 're-
quired,' in any strict, direct sense, the highly repressive B-A regimes which 
eventually appeared in South America" (p. 213). But he adds: 
More than in the past, new spurts of industrial growth seemed to depend 
on coordinated policy initiatives which emphasized stabilization, the 
confidence of the international industrial and financial bourgeoisie, and 
the cooperation of the more ''internationalized'' segments of the local 
export and manufacturing oligarchies. This, in tum, seemed to imply a 
funnel-like narrowing of the coalitional choices and institutional alter-
natives available to political and economic elites. (p. 248) 
If the requisites of deepening cannot be accepted as the defining 
character of the crisis that ushered in these new authoritarian regimes, what 
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alternative formulations might prove more satisfactory? Jose Serra considers 
two alternative hypotheses: Rui Marini's suggestion that "superexploita-
tion" of the working class is a necessary condition for capital accumulation 
in Latin America and the hypothesis of Irving Louis Horowitz and Ellen Kay 
Trimberger that these new authoritarian regimes are ''an incarnation of eco-
nomic rationality," a functional necessity for capitalist development in Latin 
America. Serra shows both theses to be simplistic and overly deterministic. 
Albert Hirschman sets down a methodological stricture that any proposed 
definition of the crisis must be accompanied by a showing that those actors 
who brought about the B-A coup had an awareness of the nature of the crisis 
that is adduced as their motive. He considers two possibilities, either of 
which might be offered by the military to justify their seizure of power: need 
for a more orthodox, market-oriented set of policies to cope with the ex-
cesses of import substitution in its early, exuberant phase (inefficiency, high 
prices, etc.), and the desire to redistribute income upward to support stag-
nating consumer durables industries. Neither suffices: "The search for a 
single, specific structural economic difficulty underlying the rise of au-
thoritarianism in Latin America seems to me unpromising" (pp. 81-82), he 
concludes. But he is not led by this to reject the O'Donnell thesis: it "should 
be widened rather than abandoned" (p. 71). The burden of Kaufman's argu-
ment is to provide one such amplification: deepening can be seen as only one 
of a few alternative strategies, all of which militate for (though do not neces-
sarily determine) a more authoritarian regime. Hirschman, with engaging 
perversity, proposes another with the suggestion that a portion of the blame 
should rest with O'Donnell and the intellectuals whose work he has drawn 
on-not forgetting Albert Hirschman himself. Intellectuals of the struc-
turalist school of thought, he argues, put forward '' an overdose of proposed 
problems" that seemed beyond the available capabilities to solve them. 
There is no need, he argues, to suppose a "strict proportionality between the 
problems a society experiences and the problems proposed to it by its intel-
lectuals, policy makers and other intellectuals" (p. 82). Hirschman thus 
suggests that intellectuals share some responsibility for setting in place "a 
precondition for radical regime change" (p. 86), but he hardly sees this as the 
whole explanation: "In stressing developments in the ideological realm, I 
have no wish to claim that they ought to supersede those explanations of the 
tum to authoritarianism that focus on some soft spot in economic structure 
or policy" (p. 87). 
If there are some admittedly partial attempts to reformulate the O'Don-
nell thesis, there are also some compelling efforts to extend it to new cases. 
Julio Cotler considers why B-A regimes have come to Brazil and the coun-
tries of the southern cone rather than (for significant example) Mexico or 
Peru. Both these countries have had authoritarian regimes, and Peru a mili-
tary one from 1968 to 1979, but they cannot be called bureaucratic-
authoritarian because they have not employed repression on the same scale 
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and they have not sought the same degree of demobilization of the lower 
classes. Drawing on the work of Cardoso and Faletto, 14 Cotler argues that 
the key difference consists in the foreign control of crucial export com-
modities in the 19th century in Peru and Mexico. This affected the "impact 
of export-led growth, the nature of the system of domination that supported 
this growth and the types of populist regimes that subsequently emerged in 
these countries" (p. 281). In Peru and Mexico (and elsewhere) national 
populist movements embracing lower and middle classes arose to cast out 
the foreign imperialists. In the political reconstructions that followed, na-
tional elites developed capabilities that allowed them to control the lower 
classes more successfully-without overt repression-in times of economic 
crisis. 
James Kurth takes the O'Donnell thesis farther from home, to Europe, 
to explain the "three great political transitions" of the past 150 years: "the 
shift from absolutist monarchies (traditional authoritarianism) to the liberal 
state and parliamentary systems in the nineteenth century; the breakdown of 
parliamentary systems and the establishment of new authoritarian regimes in 
much of Europe in the 1920s and 1930s; and the establishment of stable 
democracies after World War II" (p. 327). While he takes care to argue that 
the political impact of industrialization has been different in Europe than in 
Latin America, and more generally that the impact "for good or ill has been 
more configurative than determinative" (p. 357), he does find the O'Donnell 
thesis fruitful. In two ways Kurth's analysis sharpens the analytic focus. 
First, he distinguishes between the timing and the phasing of industrializa-
tion, and argues that whether a country was an early or a late industrializer is 
less important in understanding political outcomes than the phasing of in-
dustrialization through the manufacture of consumer nondurables, capital 
goods, and consumer durables. Second, within these phases he identifies 
specific leading sectors (textiles, steel, automobiles) and he distinguishes 
between the stages of installation and of saturation in these industries. 
The common perspective 
What tends to get lost in the thicket of argumentation is that all of these 
authors work out of a common perspective on how to approach questions of 
regime change-questions about how and why open regimes may give way 
to authoritarian ones. More than any specific conclusion or finding, the con-
tribution of this volume is this common perspective, a perspective that em-
braces issues of both substance and method and that warrants a hearing far 
beyond Latin America. 
Something of the nature of this common perspective can be seen from 
approaches that are not used. None of the authors deduces authoritarianism 
14 Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, esp. chap. 4. 
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from the functional "needs" of "system maintenance" or from some essen-
tial (ahistorical) internal logic of capitalism. Explanations of the coming of 
B-A regimes are not founded on the personal greed and ambitions of the 
officer corps nor on some general tendency of Latin cultures toward au-
thoritarian rule. There is no attempt to lay principal responsibility on exter-
nal actors, whether institutions of the capitalist core (TN Cs, the IMF, the 
CIA) or Cuban subversives whose efforts established elites sought to fore-
stall by strong countermeasures. Nor are explanations derived simply by 
seeking for one or two independent, isolated variables that correlate with the 
coming of B-A regimes. It is not that systemic relationships, the dynamics of 
capitalism, personal or cultural considerations, external factors, or inter-
country comparisons are unimportant. But, as frequently used in North 
American social science, they cannot provide an adequate explanation of the 
breakdown of popularly elected governments or the rise of authoritarian re-
gimes. What is needed and whai the Collier collection provides is an ap-
proach capable of dealing with systemic interrelations and the dynamics of 
capitalism in a historical, nonfunctionalist manner; an approach capable of 
joining external considerations of the world capitalist system with internal 
considerations of national political economies; an approach capable of 
grasping structures that limit action without deterministically eliminating the 
meaningful and consequential choices of specific actors; and an approach 
that is empirical and comparative, but grounded in history. Let us consider 
how the common perspective of its contributors views contemporary 
capitalism, how it views the state, and how it approaches certain key meth-
odological issues. 
i. Capitalism 
Capitalism is seen in a double aspect: as a world system and as a de-
fining character of particular national political-economic systems by virtue 
of their insertion into that world system. Capitalism needs to be seen on a 
global scale for two reasons. The prospects for development of one country 
are conditioned by its relationships with other countries; that is, by its posi-
tion in the world capitalist system. Unlike those approaches which see de-
velopment as being "diffused" from the more developed to the less de-
veloped countries, each country going through a similar set of stages, those 
countries that undertook industrialization first enjoyed certain opportunities 
and benefits with respect to "late industrializers" and these, in turn, with 
respect to "late-late industrializers" (as we must consider Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico). The dependencia perspective explores the ways in 
which prior industrialization of the core countries impeded development in 
Latin America. 
A global view is also necessary to identify the expansions and contrac-
tions of the world capitalist system that shape opportunities and obstacles 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:01:02 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
644 International Organization 
for different actors. Within each country, capitalism is seen as proceeding 
through more or less distinct historical stages-quite different from the 
stages of the early industrializers-the timing of which has been conditioned 
by these global cycles. In the major countries of Latin America, the move-
ment has been from primary product, export-led growth to import substitu-
tion of consumer nondurable goods, followed by consumer durables and 
capital goods. Brazil and Mexico in particular have moved toward the ex-
port of manufactured goods. Progression through these stages (which is not 
automatic, but rather the work of particular actors) effects changes in social 
structure at both elite and mass levels, changes that in turn affect the inter-
ests and the power of different actors. Each of these stages and the tran-
sitions between them are accompanied by characteristic tensions that pose 
opportunities for some, difficulties for others. Reaching for a general formu-
lation, Hirschman writes: "Growth creates inequalities and imbalances" (p. 
87): social, sectoral, regional. "In time, pressures will arise to correct some 
of these imbalances, both because the continuation of growth requires such 
correction at some point and because the imbalances bring with them social 
and political tensions, protest and action." Consequently, he argues, two 
functions must be accomplished during growth: an entrepreneurial or ac-
cumulation function, and a reform or redistributive function. In each country 
the question arises of who will emerge to perform each of these functions, and 
how they will be coordinated. To call them "functions" is no guarantee that 
they will be performed, and certainly not that they will be performed quickly 
or fairly or even humanely. '' How well these two functions are performed 
and coordinated is crucial for both economic and political outcomes of the 
growth process" (p. 88). 
ii. The state 
The state may perform either function; which or whether depends upon 
its class character-its social foundations-and the purposes that are 
poured through it. It is noteworthy that this common perspective restores a 
conception of the state, a concept that has been absent from North American 
social science until very recently. Amid the multiplicity of governments and 
changes in technical and political personnel, the authors conceive of a more 
or less continuing entity with a more or less coherent character. Although 
there are disagreements (and little in the way of an explicit "theory of the 
state"), the authors recognize two important points. First, the state is not 
simply a formal set of political institutions or a site for pluralistic group 
conflict; and it is not simply that institution (as Weber has it) which has a 
monopoly of the legitimate means of coercion within a defined territory. 
Rather, the state itself represents a coalition of class forces that defines its 
character, its social foundations, and thereby delimits its possibilities for 
action. But, second, the state is not simply an instrument of, nor is the 
character of the state strictly determined by, class forces. Fernando Hen-
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rique Cardoso insists upon a distinction between the state, conceived as 
"the basic 'pact of domination' that exists among social classes or fractions 
of dominant classes and the norms which guarantee their dominance over 
the subordinate strata," and a regime, which he identifies as "the formal 
rules that link the main political institutions (legislature to the executive, 
executive to the judiciary, and party system to them all), as well as the issue 
of the political nature of the ties between citizens and rulers (democratic, 
oligarchic, totalitarian or whatever)" (p. 38). The distinction allows him to 
argue that "an identical form of state-capitalist and dependent in the case 
of Latin America-can coexist with a variety of political regimes" (p. 39). 
"Bureaucratic-authoritarian" is thus a kind of regime, and such regimes 
come into existence without any change in the basic pact of domination 
which is the state. Consequently, there can be no simple economic determi-
nation of regime type, and yet there is room for exploring whether there may 
be an "elective affinity" between a particular economic stage or transition 
phase and a particular kind of regime. The correspondence may be more and 
less tight: looser, for example, between the easy stage of import substitution 
and the populist regimes established about the same time in some of these 
countries. And there may be disagreements about the degree oflooseness, as 
there surely are among the contributors to this volume. But because there is 
no strict economic determination, there is always room for political maneu-
ver, for action within delimiting structures. 
Because action matters, ideology matters: it is important how actors 
understand their world, and we need to understand their consciousness in 
order to understand their actions. In the case of bureaucratic authoritarian 
regimes, the ideologies that dominate are shaped around technocratic ra-
tionality. Efficiency replaces the consent of the governed as the basis on 
which the regime lays claim to legitimacy. 
Two further points need to be made about this technocratic rationality. 
First, it is spread internationally, and its carriers are the dominant institu-
tions of global capitalism-international banks, transnational corporations, 
the International Monetary Fund. Second, it has shown itself not to respect 
human dignity. This is not simply a question of encouraging cutbacks in 
social welfare expenditures or increasing income inequality in the name of 
economic rationality. It is a question of permitting torture and terror. 
iii. Methodology 
Finally, this common perspective embodies a distinctive approach to 
the conduct of social research, an approach, following Cardoso and Faletto, 
we can call "historical structural." It proceeds from the recognition of rela-
tively stable global structures, but it insists that: 
Social structures are the product of man's collective behavior. There-
fore, although enduring, social structures can be, and in fact are, 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:01:02 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
646 International Organization 
continuously transformed by social movements. Consequently our 
approach is both structural and historical: it emphasizes not just the 
structural conditioning of social life, but also the historical transforma-
tion of structures by conflict, social movements, and class struggles. 15 
The analysis is thus dialectical: despite the appearance of certain social and 
economic structures as "given" or "natural," these structures were created 
by human action in the past. They limit the present possibilities for human 
action but they do not strictly determine that action. Indeed, the crises and 
tensions that structural changes provoke may open up new possibilities as 
they close others; and new actions will, in tum, create new structural limits 
along with new possibilities. What the limits and possibilities actually are, of 
course, cannot be logically deduced. They must be discovered by careful, 
historical analysis (often comparative) of the political economies of each 
country. Within such a perspective there is considerable room for disagree-
ment concerning the precise character of structural constraints or concern-
ing the space for human choice that they permit. Cardoso, Hirschman, 
Serra, and Kaufman all insist that the original formulation of the O'Donnell 
thesis posed structural constraints in too constricting a manner. But the an-
tagonists on both sides of this debate stand together in opposition to the 
implicit determinism and linear causality of the dominant approach (cadged 
from the history of science's depictions of physics) of North American social 
science, "the academic tradition which conceived of domination and 
sociocultural relations as 'dimensions,' analytically independent of one an-
other, and together independent of the economy, as if these dimensions 
correspond to separate spheres of reality." 16 
It is frequently held against any approach that deviates from the domi-
nant one in North America that it is not rigorous, that it lacks a tough-
minded concern with data and falsification. Such a charge cannot be leveled 
against the contributions to the Collier volume. Indeed, much of the initial 
impenetrability of these essays can be laid to their insistence on subjecting 
the O'Donnell thesis to hard-nosed empirical test. 
One last contrast: instead of objectivity or value-neutrality, the histori-
cal structural approach espouses engagement and political responsibility. 
Because it believes that "there is room for alternatives in history," despite 
structural determination, it is concerned with identifying the possibilities for 
change. And among the historically available alternatives, it is committed to 
those that promise an end to domination and exploitation. It is concerned 
with clarifying who can make the critical choices, the ones that matter. 
Thus, O'Donnell himself moves on, in this volume, to explore the tensions in 
B-A regimes, tensions that may make possible political action aimed at a 
restoration of democracy .17 
15 Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, "Preface to the 
English Edition," p. x. 
16 Ibid., p. ix. 
17 For a collection of studies that focus particularly on the importance of politics in the 
maintenance and collapse of democratic regimes, without losing sight of structural constraints, 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:01:02 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Capitalism, authoritarianism, and democracy 647 
2. Capitalism and democracy in the United States 
The common perspective of the Collier book provides an estimable gen-
eral approach to the question of democracy and capitalism, not only in Latin 
America but elsewhere in the world. Above all it insists that capitalism must 
be seen from a global perspective. The terms of success of import-substitut-
ing industrialization, and the attendant moments of openness and closedness 
in Latin America over the past half-century, have been conditioned by the 
place of these countries in the world capitalist system and by the changing 
structure and dynamics of this global political economy. Drawing as they do 
from the dependencia perspective, 18 all the contributors to the Collier vol-
ume share this much as a deep and common assumption. Nevertheless, be-
cause the thrust of the O'Donnell thesis is to stress how the enveloping 
structures of dependency play through domestic political-economic institu-
tions and processes, the essays in the Collier volume downplay, though cer-
tainly do not deny, the role of foreign actors in encouraging or facilitating the 
installation of B-A regimes. 
Some threats to democracy do stem directly from the poli~ies and prac-
tices of foreign actors, however. Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin 
American Relations has several essays that redress this imbalance by 
focusing on the role of U.S.-based actors, both public and private, in 
facilitating the emergence of authoritarian regimes in Latin America. Michael 
Klare and Cynthia Arn son argue that the military assistance programs of the 
U.S. government have had as their consequence, whether intended or not, 
the encouragement of authoritarian regimes. "In the name of combatting 
subversion-for what ever reason, be it development or democracy-the 
United States equipped, trained, coordinated, expanded, and actually 
helped create the forces of repression in Latin America" (p. 146). Two other 
pieces single out banks for particular attention. Roberto Frenkel and Guil-
lermo O'Donnell contend that the orthodox economic policies that the IMF 
insists upon as a condition for stabilization loans "cannot be implemented 
without a state that is sufficiently authoritarian to suppress the opposition 
arising against their high social costs" (p. 212). Barbara Stallings reaches a 
similar conclusion in examining the consequences of the terms of a private 
bank consortium loan to Peru in 1976: "stabilization programs . . . have 
proved impossible to implement in Third World countries without highly 
authoritarian regimes" (p. 252). 
Ira Katznelson and Kenneth Prewitt identify "a very high degree of 
fundamental continuity in the policy of the U.S. government" toward the 
hemisphere over the past two decades, centered on two principles: "the 
maintenance of a skewed pattern of north-south geopolitical capacity,'' and 
''the maintenance of a skewed pattern of distribution of economic oppor-
see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 
18 Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America. 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:01:02 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
648 International Organization 
tunities and rewards" (p. 26). Sustaining these imbalances of power and 
benefit may require the U.S. to support the installation or continuation of 
authoritarian regimes, but Katznelson and Prewitt do not insist upon any 
invariant tendency of U.S. foreign policy in this direction. Instead, their 
analysis delineates how and why the U.S. sustains "apparently contradic-
tory initiatives like support both for authoritarian regimes and for the pro-
motion of human rights" (p. 34)-"hard" and "soft" policies. 
Though several of its essays do help us fill out our understanding of 
democracy and capitalism in Latin America, the Fagen volume focuses con-
cern on foreign policy rather than on democracy. What is most provocative 
in the book is not what it argues about the consequences of U.S. foreign 
policy toward Latin America but what it reveals about the changing roots of 
U.S. foreign policy. It is a premise of the volume (though it is not one that all 
of the contributors accept) that the received ways of understanding U.S. 
foreign policy are no longer adequate. Important changes are taking place in 
the political economy of the U.S. and in the role of the U.S. in the world 
capitalist system. Consequently, the Fagen volume proceeds via a series of 
exploratory case studies, trying to tap these changes as they bear on Latin 
America. ''The elaboration of a model of how the hemisphere works has far 
outrun the elaboration of a compatible model of how the United States 
works," Fagen argues (p. 3). For the most part these essays employ the 
same historical-structural method as those in the Collier volume, but there is 
no central, overarching thesis to give these explorations the kind of unifying 
intellectual shape that the O'Donnell thesis gives The New Authoritarianism 
in Latin America. If we continue to focus on the question of democracy, 
however, we can piece together from these various case studies of the 
changing "deep sources" of U.S. foreign policy an interesting but disquiet-
ing perspective on prospects for democracy in the United States. 
Kalman Silvert has suggested that one reason that the study of U.S. 
foreign policy toward the hemisphere is important is that it reveals '' Ameri-
can leadership as it behaves when untrammeled by domestic rules." 19 That 
is, it suggests what antidemocratic proclivities, denied expression at home 
by the institutions of American democracy, lurk within U.S. elites. Without 
denying the importance of this insight, we have in mind a different kind of 
approach to the question of democracy in the U.S., one that draws upon the 
common perspective of the Collier volume. Silvert's suggestion focuses 
upon the possibility of antidemocratic intentions among key elites in the 
U.S., but the historical-structural perspective of the Collier volume directs 
our attention toward a stalemating and erosion of democracy in the U.S. that 
may occur without anyone's intending it. 
We are not intending to argue "the Latin Americanization of the United 
States" -that would be both facile and misleading. Although it is sobering to 
19 Kalman Silvert, "The Lone Eagle Abroad," chap. 3 in The Reason For Democracy (New 
York: Viking, 1977), p. 45. 
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recollect Kaufman's conclusion that B-A regimes have been most repressive 
(in Chile and in Uruguay) where competitive political systems had been the 
longest and most firmly established (p. 227), political institutions and politi-
cal culture in the United States have a history far different from any coun-
try's in Latin America. And despite the persisting class inequality in the 
United States, its system of social stratification is very different. Neverthe-
less, the approach that has been taken to studying the relationship between 
capitalism and democracy in Latin America could address the same question 
in the U.S. in a manner more fruitful and probing, less abstract and static, 
than current efforts. Such a historical-structural approach to the question of 
prospects for democracy in the United States would seek to identify the 
tensions and potential crises in the U.S. political economy. It would examine 
the historically developed structural constraints that delimit the horizons of 
possibility, and it would explore the spheres of free action for particular 
actors within those limits to preserve, revive or transform the political (and 
economic) institutions and processes of the United States. Our point of de-
parture for such an analysis must be the recognition that deep and dramatic 
change, largely of international provenance, is afoot in the political economy 
of the United States. 
The last ten years have seen dramatic changes in the world capitalist 
system and in the U.S. role within that system: the American defeat in Viet-
nam, the OPEC oil price shocks, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem, and the emergence of Europe and Japan as economies capable of chal-
lenging the U.S. predominance in a number of key manufacturing sectors. 
For a quarter century after World War II the United States was a hegemonic 
power in the world, most particularly in the western hemisphere, able to 
insist upon its arrangements in matters of diplomacy, trade, investment, 
weaponry, currency transactions, and nearly anything else it considered of 
importance. But now, as Fagen notes in his Introduction, "large fissures 
have appeared in the hegemonic facade" (p. 3). This challenge to U.S. he-
gemony brings in its train a series of consequences, for the United States 
and for its role in the world, that we are only beginning to grasp. 
Some of the essays in the Fagen volume are curiously silent about the 
decline of U.S. hegemony ·and about its implications, but a few of the case 
studies do embody a clear perception of this change; glimpses of it are to be 
captured in a number of others. We focus on it here because it is certain to 
have important consequences for democracy, both abroad and at home. On 
the one hand it is likely to alter the interests and power of U.S.-based actors 
in operating outside the United States. And on the other hand the changes in 
the world capitalist system are likely to pose problems for the U.S. political 
economy, problems that will put significant stress on the democratic chan-
nels of American government. 
In studying this sea change, the decline of U.S. hegemony in the world 
capitalist system and its consequences for U.S. foreign policy, we need first 
to note that we are more impoverished in our concepts for grasping this 
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transformation than we are, for significant example, in the Latin American 
case. It is precisely the availability of a sophisticated conceptualization of 
the process of import-substituting industrialization in Latin America-with 
its attendant ideas of the "easy stage," "exhaustion" and "deepening"-
that makes possible the richness of the O'Donnell thesis about the coming of 
bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. 
What equivalent broad-scale understanding of the political economy of 
the United States or of industrialized countries do we have to center an 
analysis of the current difficulties or crises in the U.S.A.? The theory of 
industrial (or postindustrial) society is unlikely to be of any service. Just as 
the dependency perspective has been grounded in an understanding of the 
developmental dilemmas oflate dependent capitalism, what is needed for the 
U.S.A. is an understanding of the developmental dilemmas of advanced or 
mature capitalism. For the most part what we have available are catch 
phrases without much analytical probity: "reindustrialization" is currently 
in vogue. But in the concept of the welfare state (or, alternatively, of social 
democracy) we do have a serviceable prospect because it comprehends, in 
comparative terms, a major transformation, begun nearly a century ago, in 
the political economy of those countries in Europe and North America that 
were among the first to embark on industrialization.20 In Latin America and 
in other late-late industrializing countries, a large role for the state in capital 
accumulation was a necessary if not a sufficient condition for industrializa-
tion. In the United States and in other earlier industrializers, however, pri-
vate sector corporations and banks performed this function for the birth 
of a succession of leading manufacturing industries-textiles, steel, au-
tomobiles. The state became significantly involved in the economy only after 
industrialization, and for two different but complementary reasons. First, 
social welfare policies were enacted to protect the citizenry from the vul-
nerabilities of wage labor (unemployment, disability, old age); and second, 
the state undertook the management of aggregate demand through fiscal and 
monetary policy. The welfare state managed the tensions between capitalism 
and democracy by balancing (in Hirschman's terms) the accumulation func-
tion and the reform function. 
Because of the insular perspective from which the United States is 
commonly viewed by its own social science, the notions of the welfare state 
and social democracy may seem ill-fitting characterizations of this country. 
This impression may be strengthened by the substantial and evident dif-
ferences between the United States and the advanced capitalist democracies 
of Europe, to which the concepts are more commonly applied, with their 
stronger planning apparatuses and stronger party systems in which mass-
based socialist parties play leading roles. 
The notion of the welfare state or of social democracy, however, is pre-
20 See Asa Briggs, "The Welfare State in Historical Perspective," European Journal of 
Sociology 2 (1%1). 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:01:02 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Capitalism, authoritarianism, and democracy 651 
cisely the conceptualization that Katznelson and Prewitt employ to ground 
their analysis of the roots of U.S. foreign policy toward the western hemi-
sphere. Alan Wolfe and Jerry Sanders concur, offering the provocative 
suggestion that a proper understanding of the Cold War liberalism that has 
played a key role in shaping U.S. foreign policy is possible only if it is seen as 
the American version of social democracy: "the forces pushing toward so-
cial democracy in Europe, when transplanted to the United States, trans-
formed themselves into military Keynesianism" (p. 49). The insights of 
these two essays can serve as the basis of a more general analysis of the 
political economy of the United States, one that takes account of the 
peculiarities of the U.S. vis-a-vis the industrial democracies of Europe and 
provides us with a way to assess the implications for democracy of the 
changing role of the U.S. within the world capitalist system. What emerges 
as central in these analyses are a particular coalition that has dominated U.S. 
politics (both foreign and domestic) since the Second World War and a par-
ticular ideology that has served to hold this coalition together. In several 
other contributions to the Fagen volume changes in the international politi-
cal economy emerge that are dismembering this coalition and rendering its 
ideology increasingly irrelevant. The likely result is stalemate-the absence 
of any coalition to center U.S. politics-and, in such a circumstance, the 
erosion of democracy becomes a distinct possibility. 
Katznelson and Prewitt single out two characteristics, "low classness" 
and "low stateness," to distinguish the U.S. from the social democracies of 
western Europe. 21 By "low stateness" they mean that government in the 
United States is divided and circumscribed by constitutional arrangements 
(federalism, the separation of powers). The state is big but diffuse in 
character. By "low classness" they mean that the U.S. is characterized by a 
"plurality of affiliations of a non-class kind." The United States may have 
the most developed class relations in the world, but society and politics tend 
to be less organized along class lines than in Germany or England or Swe-
den. Because of low classness, labor becomes yet another interest group 
rather than an organized working class able to exert countervailing pressure. 
"Policies are considered not in terms of class conflict but of a cross-class 
hegemonic interest group framework" (p. 35). Labor has been one element 
in the cross-class coalition that has dominated American politics for much of 
the period since World War II, together with large corporations and banks, 
farmers, the state's national security managers, and others. Katznelson and 
Prewitt argue that low stateness and low classness are the key to the dualism 
in U.S. foreign policy of hard policies and soft policies. The state can engage 
simultaneously in actions that proceed within constitutional democratic 
pathways and in covert actions where the Constitution is, in effect, in sus-
pension, the separation of powers replaced by an imperial presidency and 
21 Cf. Ira Katznelson, "Considerations on Social Democracy in the United States," Com-
parative Politics 11 (October 1978), pp. 77-99. 
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limited government replaced by the far-reaching demands of "national secu-
rity.'' While it is possible in some ways and at some times to pursue soft 
policies, labor has come to share an interest with its coalition partners in the 
current relations of domination. Moreover, "the very pluralism of American 
life outside the workplace fashions a degree of freedom in the relations be-
tween the state and capital virtually unknown elsewhere" (p. 34). 
Alan Wolfe and Jerry Sanders focus their attention on the ideology that 
has served to hold this cross-class coalition together. Cold War liberalism, 
they argue, joined "domestic liberals who saw defense spending as a mac-
roeconomic stimulant to economic growth and strategic thinkers who were 
arguing that an expansionist Soviet menace constituted the greatest threat to 
American civilization" (p. 44). Wolfe and Sanders thus contend that Cold 
War liberalism (or military Keynesianism), which has often led the United 
States to support anticommunist but undemocratic regimes abroad, emerged 
out of the search for a stable alliance to center U.S. political life. "The 
social-democratic goal of centrist state management of capitalism combined 
with moderate reform to harmonize all social classes became the basis of a 
consensus that would make the Cold War rival the New Deal as the founda-
tion of the Democratic Party's post-war political unity" (p. 49). 22 Wolfe and 
Sanders attempt to explain the resurgence in the past few years of this Cold 
War liberalism, which "by 1968 had seemed dead beyond resurrection." 
This is surprising, they contend, because with the decline of U.S. hegemony 
"the material reality of the U.S. position had shifted" (p. 46). "Those who 
argue ... that material interests determine foreign policy options must con-
front the proposition that increased defense spending and a militant foreign 
policy would be as harmful to American capitalism now as they once were 
stimulatory" (p. 47). 
The United States in the world political economy 
The welfare state conceptualization of Katznelson, Prewitt, Wolfe, and 
Sanders (taking note of the peculiarities of the United States seen in this 
light) allows us to grasp the consequences of this "changed material reality 
of the U.S."-its changing role in the world political economy. Several of 
the essays in the Fagen volume address important changes in key sectors of 
the U.S. economy. The common perspective of the Collier volume directs 
our attention to important questions: what are the social and political 
stresses being visited upon the United States as a consequence of the decline 
of U.S. hegemony? What are the resulting alterations in the interests and 
power of key actors? How are political coalitions fracturing and reorganiz-
ing? What ideologies are being drawn on to guide the actions of these coali-
22 Cf. Alan Wolfe, "Has Social Democracy a Future?" Comparative Politics 11 (October 
1978), pp. 100-125. 
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tions in pursuit of private and public well-being? Let us attend to these ques-
tions in trade and investment, in finance, and in energy, before considering 
the implications for democracy in the United States. 
i. Trade and investment 
Steven Volk begins his essay on "The International Competitiveness of 
the U.S. Economy: A Study of Steel and Electronics" with a clear percep-
tion that "the structures of the world economy are changing," and that "the 
consequences of these changes are being felt acutely on the streets of New 
York and Des Moines, Youngstown and Miami" (p. 92). The problems with 
the U.S. economy are more fundamental, he argues, than growing trade im-
balances: there are "basic shifts in the nature of production currently chal-
lenging the international competitiveness of the U.S. economy." Two fac-
tors seem particularly important: ''the loss of technological competitiveness 
and the shift of productive capital, especially in labor-intensive manufactur-
ing industries, from the U.S. to low wage areas abroad" (p. 91). Volk fo-
cuses upon two key sectors of the U.S. economy that have grown less com-
petitive: steel and electronics. One is technologically stagnant in the United 
States and without significant foreign investment, the other technologically 
dynamic and with substantial direct foreign investment. But both involve 
declining manufacturing capability and employment in the U.S. Why have 
these sectors (and others) grown uncompetitive? Yolk's answer is complex, 
turning on both domestic and international factors, and considerations of 
industry structure and strategic decisions of the firms within the two indus-
tries. 
Contrary to the claims of the industry itself, the U.S. steel industry has 
grown uncompetitive not because of "dumping" by Japanese and European 
producers but because of its failure to introduce technological innovations as 
rapidly as its major international competitors. This in tum arose, Volk ar-
gues, because of the oligopolistic structure of the U.S. steel industry in the 
years before it faced international competition (though he also indicates that 
the higher dividend pay-out rates of the U.S. firms in comparison with 
Japanese firms, and simple corporate mismanagement, also played a role). A 
different set of factors explains the decline of manufacturing in the elec-
tronics industry. Here the U.S. firms have maintained technological pace, 
but to retain competitiveness they have moved a significant percentage of 
their manufacturing capacity to foreign subsidiaries in low-wage countries. 
Volk focuses his analysis to assess the consequences of the restructur-
ing of the world economy for workers in the United States and to consider 
what steps the U.S. government might take with regard to the growing un-
competitiveness of U.S. industry. His conclusions are not cheery. So far as 
Volk can see, the outcome for labor will be lower wages, intensification of 
the work process (speed-up), and a threat to collective bargaining rights. 
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Moreover, he expects little help from the government to ameliorate the pre-
dicament of American workers. "The government is increasingly likely," he 
argues, "to act in concert with industry to ensure, essentially, that the 
weakest sectors of capital are sacrificed in the interests of the stronger" (p. 
121). But weakest and strongest in what sense-political? technological? 
financial? One should not assume that technological or financial dynamism in 
new industries translates smoothly and quickly into political power to shape 
government policy. He goes on to argue, provocatively but without compel-
ling evidence, that "the state, in a sense, determines the pace of industrial 
restructuring through its numerous commercial, aid, fiscal and monetary 
policies, but competition within the industry itself will determine the out-
come" (p. 121, emphasis added). 
Yolk's analysis, while penetrating in many regards, is nowhere weaker 
than when he touches upon political matters. He accords very little inde-
pendent role to political factors, and he is barely concerned with what 
domestic political consequences may follow from the restructuring of the 
world capitalist system. The peculiar U.S. version of social democracy has 
rested upon a political alliance, forged in the New Deal, between capital and 
labor in such key sectors as steel and automobiles. In steel, where foreign 
competition poses a threat to both capital and labor, this alliance remains 
intact; but what is happening in those sectors such as electronics or au-
tomobiles where transnational corporations are furthering the loss of U.S. 
jobs by moving production abroad? What will be the consequences for the 
coalitions at the foundations of American politics? 
A more politically sophisticated analysis of the international restruc-
turing of manufacturing sectors is provided by Peter Evans's essay on 
"Shoes, OPIC and the Unquestioning Persuasion: Multinational Corpora-
tions and U.S.-Brazilian Relations." Evans is first concerned to explain a 
key choice of development strategy in the early 1970s in Brazil: to expand 
manufactured exports rather than to pursue deepening of the industrial 
structure. His analysis turns on the increased penetration of the Brazilian 
economy by multinational corporations, and the political conflicts that this 
engendered as Brazilian industrial activity increased but the share of 
Brazilian-owned firms in manufacturing decreased. The choice of an export 
route eased the political tensions between "nationalist" and "inter-
nationalist" segments of the national bourgeoisie in Brazil ("it is both at-
tractive to multinationals and not threatening to local capital,'' p. 333), but 
sparked increasing tension between Brazil and the United States as imports 
of manufactured goods from Brazil (along with those from other newly in-
dustrializing countries [NICs]) further threatened the U.S. trade position 
and U.S. employment in several manufacturing sectors. 
By this route Evans's attention is drawn back to the United States: "the 
postulated result," he argues, "is an increasing disjunction between the 
multinationals and the political apparatus of their home state" (p. 334), as 
the MNCs become the vehicle by which manufacturing capacity is shifted 
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from the U.S. to Brazil and other NICs. "The internationalist front"-the 
uniform support of business, labor, and government for unimpeded world 
flows of goods and capital-"has begun to develop some cracks" (p. 334), 
he argues. Evans finds some evidence for his postulated "increasing dis-
junction" in interviews with executives in firms in the shoe industry (an 
industry particularly hard hit by import competition) and in examination of 
the congressional fight in 1977-78 over the renewal of the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, the government insurance program to protect the 
foreign holdings ofU.S.-based firms. But it is fairer to say that what he finds 
is less the division of the capitalist class in the United States into "inter-
nationalist" and "nationalist" segments than the very beginnings of doubt-
ing the "naive and unquestioning persuasion" (Veblen's phrase) that what is 
good for U.S.-based corporations is good for the United States. Neverthe-
less, "no matter how carefully qualified or tentatively stated, the implica-
tions of the argument remain radical" (p. 335), he concludes, because they 
suggest a possible dramatic restructuring of political alliances within the 
United States. 
ii. Finance 
"Perhaps most striking is the enhanced role of the private banks and the 
international financial institutions," Fagen writes in surveying the cast of 
actors that figure prominently in the case studies (p. 13). For the most part, 
the focus on international financial institutions concerns the consequences of 
their behavior in less developed countries. But what of their situation at 
home in the United States or in the other core countries of the world 
capitalist system? Frenkel and O'Donnell's brief, appended review of the 
beginnings of the IMF' s orientations and functions in the late 1940s is at best 
suggestive of what sustains these orientations today, particularly because of 
dramatic changes in the last decade. These changes-the increased interna-
tional scale of activities of the major banks, the dramatic surge in interna-
tional liquidity stemming from the OPEC price hikes, the consolidation of 
the Euromarkets, the increased lending to governments of less developed 
countries, the increased use of electronic facilities-have significantly 
transformed the character of banks and of financial markets. 
A number of issues warrant exploration. The regulatory apparatus of 
the U.S. federal government toward banks, created in the 1930s to constrain 
private power, has been called into question by two different circumstances. 
On the one hand, the Euromarkets permit the circumnavigation of some of 
these regulations by the large transnational banks; on the other hand, the 
regulatory scheme in force in Japan allows much closer cooperation between 
banks and industrial firms in the financing of manufacturing ventures-a 
factor in the competitive edge of some Japanese corporations. What would 
be the consequences of the alternative proposals for regulation and deregu-
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lation of banking in the United States that are likely to be proposed, and 
what political coalitions will form around each of them? To take another 
issue: the fiscal difficulties of state and local governments in the U.S. federal 
system in recent years have made these political entities far more dependent 
upon financial institutions to maintain solvency. The formation of New York 
City's Metropolitan Assistance Corporation, with power to veto spending 
measures passed through normal governmental channels if the Corporation 
considers them fiscally unsound, is the clearest example. Though the conse-
quences can be expected to be less draconian, there is a clear parallel that 
warrants exploration between these situations and the orthodox stabilization 
programs insisted upon by the IMF in approving standby agreements with 
less developed countries. 23 
iii. Energy 
Nowhere is the increased international vulnerability of the U.S. political 
economy more readily apparent than in questions of energy. That topic en-
ters the Fagen volume only through a comprehensive recounting of pro-
tracted negotiations over the sale of natural gas to the United States by 
Mexico. In late 1977 Energy Secretary Schlesinger refused to approve an 
agreement signed by six American gas-transmission companies to purchase 
gas from PE MEX, the Mexican state-owned oil and gas monopoly, because 
the price agreed upon was significantly above the regulated price of natural 
gas in the United States. Two years later, however, after the President and 
the Congress had finally approved an energy bill providing for the decontrol 
of natural gas prices, a new agreement was reached that did accord the 
Mexicans a price approaching the one they had originally insisted upon. 
Because of the peculiarities of this case and because Fagen and Nan's 
discussion sticks very close-too close-to the specifics of their narrative, 
only a very few of the complex array of political economic questions that 
energy matters raise in the United States are addressed. But their discussion 
does underscore two fundamental points. First, it provides a telling illustra-
tion of the decline of U.S. hegemony: the United States proved unable to 
dominate its neighbor to the south in ways that it had been accustomed to in 
the past. Second, it demonstrates that while the choices made concerning 
energy within the current constraints will work a dramatic transformation on 
the United States over the next quarter century, energy problems and so-
lutions ''are ultimately reflections of more fundamental patterns of politics 
and economic conditions in these two societies" (p. 422). The force of this 
point is best seen by calling to mind Amory Lovins's arresting argument that 
23 See Martin Shefter, "Organizing for Armageddon: The Political Consequences of the New 
York City Fiscal Crisis," paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual 
meeting, Washington, D.C., August 1980. 
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the United States faces a fundamental choice between a hard energy path, 
which uses nonrenewable fuels (fossil and nuclear) to generate electricity in 
centralized, large-scale sites, and a soft energy path, which relies on an array 
of technologies using renewable sources in small, decentralized projects 
with the source closely matched to end-use needs. This choice, which can 
neither be avoided nor compromised, Lovins argues, entails wide-reaching 
consequences. The hard path, he claims, will lead to centralization, concen-
tration of economic and political power, greater inequality, increasing 
foreign and domestic security concerns, and the undermining of democracy 
through increased reliance on elitist technocracy. The soft path, by contrast, 
is claimed to nurture a more participatory, decentralized, and democratic 
form of society. 24 The Lovins argument is important in showing the limits 
energy structures might place on political outcomes; but while it stresses the 
importance of choice and action in the present, it tends toward a kind of 
determinism and forecloses choice and action in the future. Fagen and Nau 
are right to conclude from their case that "existing structures of political and 
social life" are likely to shape the resolution of energy related matters "at 
least as much as energy itself is likely to affect basic political and social 
developments" (p. 423). 
Prospects for American democracy 
If we draw together these various glimpses of the changing international 
economic order as they affect the United States, what are the implications 
for democracy? What kinds of challenges is U.S. democracy likely to en-
counter in the next decade? Is there a danger of some form of au-
thoritarianism? Might political and economic elites be tempted by solutions 
to political-economic stresses that they have acquiesced in or fostered in 
Latin America? 
We see, first, the elements of a kind of political economic crisis: not just 
energy worries, stubborn inflation, and a stop-and-go pattern of stagnating 
economic growth but also the decline of several major manufacturing sectors 
on which economic development in the United States has centered in this 
century. Even where U.S. firms remain preeminent, the transnationalization 
of their operations has furthered a restructuring of the international division 
of labor in which the United States no longer has such a privileged position. 
Changes in other crucial sectors like banking and energy hasten this reor-
ganization of the world economy and of the decline of American hegemony. 
While the pieces of this crisis are apparent enough, and despite several gen-
eral formulations, we do not yet have a satisfactory understanding of the 
current predicament (less of the consequences for specific domestic actors, 
24 Amory Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 
1977); cf. Barry Commoner, The Politics of Energy (New York: Knopf, 1979). 
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and still less of their likely courses of action). What does seem clear is that 
this crisis must be seen in international context and that it does not emanate 
from any single cause or contradiction. 
What we see second, and this is perhaps the most striking conclusion to 
emerge from the Fagen volume, is the limited degree to which dominant 
actors grasp the character of the changes that are sweeping them along. In-
stead, there is a determined clinging to ideological visions adequate to guide 
action in the past but that may now work to the detriment of those who 
previously were so well served by them. There is more than the resurgence 
of Cold War liberalism, despite the passing of the material conditions that 
first nurtured it. Peter Evans searches diligently for the formation of a pro-
tectionist "nationalist" coalition among the smaller domestic entrepreneurs 
and labor that have been harmed by international trade in recent years. He 
finds it hard to locate. In the domestic shoe industry, particularly injured by 
import competition, local manufacturers have tried to find safe specialty 
niches or to leave the industry altogether. "Even those who see themselves 
as engaged in a battle for survival in which their major opponents are foreign 
lack an ideological framework which might lead them into 'nationalist poli-
tics' "(p. 325). Instead, they continue to espouse an internationalist position 
(sometimes scapegoating the "decline of American craftsmanship"), or they 
become resigned and stoic. The internationalist ideology that has dominated 
U.S. business circles has been attacked more in the Congress ("in anticipa-
tion of pressure from affected interest groups more than as a result of such 
pressure") than even by labor. The AFL-CIO, for example, became in-
volved in the congressional debate over OPIC only after it had become con-
troversial. Only very slowly has organized labor begun to question its 
espousal of the internationalist position of Cold War liberalism. 
And we see, third, a variety of features of the social and political land-
scape in the United States that make difficult a satisfactory adjustment to the 
currents of change in the world capitalist system even if there were a clear 
perception of the need for change. These can be seen to stem largely from 
"low staleness" and "low classness," the features that mark the distinc-
tiveness of the U.S.A. in comparison with other welfare states. "Low stale-
ness" makes difficult any planning or coherent program of industrial policy 
to revive manufacturing activity in the United States. It also impedes any 
effort to allocate losses from the current crisis equitably across the popula-
tion. With "low classness" it makes it easier for groups to prevent change 
desired by others than to promote changes of benefit to themselves. These 
long-standing features of American exceptionalism worked to slow (in com-
parison with European countries) the transition of the United States toward 
a welfare state in response to a different crisis earlier in the century, until a 
broad cross-class coalition was assembled in the 1930s. The changes in the 
international political economy have served (and are serving), however, to 
dismember what remains of this New Deal cum Cold War coalition. The 
correspondences of interest that welded it together no longer obtain. But far 
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from being able to locate a new dominant coalition with a fresh vision of the 
future shape of the U.S. political economy, we see the persistence, even the 
nostalgic recovery, of Cold War liberalism in a world very different from 
the one in which that ideology first took hold. The 1980 election, as Walter Dean 
Burnham has argued, involved not a "critical realignment" but a "classic 
electoral case of conservative revitalization politics." "The decay of empire 
and economy, taken together, has created optimal conditions for skilled con-
servative political entrepreneurs to offer the most consoling and least dis-
turbing way out of the impasse .... Rhetorically, at least, the Reagan cam-
paign promised something of a return to two supposedly golden ages: the 
1950s internationally and the 1920s domestically. " 25 The Carter administra-
tion was judged inadequate by the electorate: "the 1980 election was a land-
slide vote of no confidence in an incumbent administration." It is very un-
likely that the Reagan political program can prove adequate to the changed 
reality of the United States. 
The currents of change in the world capitalist system are altering the 
bases of power and interest of U.S.-based actors. If the difficulties that these 
changes create prove intractable to the normal channels of governance, what 
we face is the prospect of frustration and stalemate that could threaten de-
mocracy in the United States. While it is conceivable that a major national 
security crisis could bring about a dramatic suspension of political rights and 
democratic procedures, we are far more likely to see the slow erosion of 
democracy than its sudden collapse. The present U.S. commitment to de-
mocracy is an equivocal one, the normal channels of governance blending 
some undemocratic elements with the democratic institutions and processes 
that have been the source of national confidence and pride. Prolonged stale-
mate could lead to the erosion of democracy in either of two ways: via the 
circumnavigation of democratic channels or via the control and manipulation 
of participation to make conflict more manageable. 
i. Circumnavigation and depoliticization 
When policy issues become stalemated between the Congress and the 
Executive Branch (or within either), the extraordinary character of the crisis 
may lead some actors to look to resolve problems in other ways, ways that 
circumnavigate the constitutional channels. These "other ways" might be 
thought by all concerned to be extraordinary mechanisms for one-time use 
only, but if they succeed they may suggest themselves for use again. More-
over, while the problems they are designed to solve may look unusual and 
idiosyncratic when they first appear, they may in fact be harbingers of recur-
'25 Walter Dean Burnham, "The 1980 Earthquake: Realignment, Reaction, or What?" in 
Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, eds., The Hidden Election: Politics and Economics in the 
1980 Presidential Campaign (New York: Pantheon, 1981), p. 127. 
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ring problems of the future. The danger to democracy is that the "extraordi-
nary solutions" may well be significantly less democratic than the consti-
tutional channels. When New York City found itself in fiscal crisis, the 
Metropolitan Assistance Corporation was created and vested with power to 
review and to veto all decisions of the mayor and city council with significant 
budgetary consequences. At the national level, the Federal Reserve Board 
has increasingly played a central role in the management of economic policy. 
Both cases represent a diminution of the scope and authority of elected offi-
cials, and increasing reliance upon "depoliticized," technical expertise.26 
Either or both of these may be appropriate courses of action; but such cir-
cumnavigation of normal democratic channels may become increasingly 
frequent, and less and less of importance will be settled through democratic 
processes. Those impatient with the stalemates of democratic processes may 
even argue that certain issues or policy areas be permanently de-
politicized-removed from decision by political institutions and redefined 
as issues to be resolved through the market or through technical-scientific 
expertise. 
ii. Incorporation and controlled participation 
Alternatively, stalemate might contribute to the erosion of democracy 
through efforts to transform the normal channels of government so that they 
can once again function but in ways that are no longer genuinely democratic. 
Participation by the broad mass of the citizenry might be encouraged, not 
just tolerated; but it would be participation within constraints, and gradually 
and increasingly controlled from above. Certain positions might be defined 
as irresponsible-in the name of national security, for example-and cease 
to be topics of legitimate political discourse. Leaders of popular organiza-
tions might be coopted or carefully selected replacements maneuvered to 
succeed them; activities of these organizations might then be orchestrated 
and channeled. The result would be a superficial appearance of democratic 
participation, but demands would be limited to those which could easily be 
accommodated. Stalemate would be avoided, but at the cost of genuinely 
free democratic participation. Corporatist institutions and techniques have 
been largely unknown in the United States, but some current proposals to 
reinvigorate the U.S. economy have potentially corporatist implications. 
Various proposals for tripartite committees among labor, industry, and gov-
ernment (such as Business Week's recent call for a new Social Contract)27 
and certain characteristics of the Chrysler loan guarantee might be harbin-
26 For a parallel discussion of deregulation and science and technology policy, see David 
Dickson, "Limiting Democracy: Technocrats and the Liberal State," democracy 1, 1 (January 
1981), pp. 61-79. 
27 Business Week, 20 June 1980. 
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gers of unwelcome developments. The United States might follow the more 
benign "societal" corporatism model of western Europe rather than the 
harsher "statist" corporatism of some Latin American and Latin European 
countries, but the lack of a genuinely social democratic party in the United 
States leaves this open to question.28 
It is important to recognize how different this line of analysis is from 
another prominent diagnosis of the ailings of U.S. democracy, the "over-
load" thesis emerging most seminally from the work of Samuel P. Hun-
tington. He claims that increased participation and popular expectations for 
social programs have led to a steady increase in the level of demands on 
government. This has "overloaded" the institutional capacity of the gov-
ernment; the basic requisites of governability are threatened. Huntington 
argues that the United States is suffering from an "excess of democracy" 
(too much participation, too many demands). Moderation in the level of 
demands placed on government is necessary if democracy is to be pre-
served. Democracy, from this perspective, is as much the problem as it is 
endangered.29 
This is not the place for a full-blown critique of the "overload" thesis, 
but several of its limitations warrant mention. First, it fails to give a satis-
factory account of the source of the new demands being placed on govern-
ment. It says only that there has been a "surge of creedal passions" for 
equality. There is no sense of how the functioning of the capitalist economy 
in the United States creates certain problems that affected groups bring to 
government for assistance. The "overload" perspective tends to view the 
problem of U.S. democracy in narrowly political rather than in political-
economic terms. Second, the "overload" perspective tends to view the 
United States in an insular fashion rather than as enmeshed in and affected 
by the currents of the world capitalist system. Third, this perspective speaks 
only of particularized demands being made on the government, not of coali-
tions based on convergent interests urging different programs for adoption. 
There is no conception that these coalitionalpatterns of conflict, rather than 
simply the level of demands, affect the governability of democracy. (Still less 
is there any conception that class-based patterns of power affect the gov-
28 On the distinction between societal and statist corporatism, see Philippe Schmitter, "Still 
the Century of Corporatism?" in Frederick Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., The New Cor-
poratism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1974), pp. 85-131. Leo Panitch voices doubts, however, "whether state coercion, 
at least in the form of repressing rank-and-file actions and insulating union leadership from its 
effects, is not a sine qua non of establishing stable corporatist structures." See "The Develop-
ment of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies," Comparative Political Studies 10, 1 (April 1977) 
p. 68 
29 Samuel P. Huntington, "The United States," in Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and 
Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the 
Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975). For other formulations 
of the overload thesis, see Samuel Brittan, "The Economic Contradictions of Democracy," 
British Journal of Political Science 5 (1975); and Samuel Beer, "Political Overload and 
Federalism," Polity 10 (Fall 1977), pp. 5-17. 
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emability of democracy.) Finally, there is no role for ideology in this 
argument-no concern that actors will perceive their interests (and those of 
others) through the lens of ideologies that may be inadequate to a changing 
reality or that may make it impossible for coalitions to form a basis for stable 
governance. The overload thesis, in short, provides only a deeply flawed 
understanding of the prospects for democracy in the United States. In con-
tradistinction to the approach we have been sketching, analyses like Hun-
tington's miss the peculiar problems of government in capitalist democ-
racies, fail to grasp the international character of capitalism, ignore the 
coalitional bases of American democracy, and are blind to the importance 
of ideology. 
Our discussion has taken us some considerable distance from Latin 
America, but two points of connection should be stressed by way of conclu-
sion. First, while it is a commonplace that development opportunities in 
Latin America are conditioned by actors and structures based in the United 
States, there has been insufficient attention paid to how the changing role of 
the U.S. in the world economy is significantly altering the development 
context for Latin American countries. The slowing of growth in the United 
States, the decline of key industrial sectors, the possibility of protec-
tionism-all these have implications for what development strategies can 
successfully be pursued. The second point is a political cognate of the 
first: nothing is so important for democracy in Latin America as the health of 
democracy in the United States. It is not just that democratic processes in 
the U.S., particularly the congressional check on the Executive, serve in 
some instances to restrain U.S. foreign policy from actions that might fur-
ther embattle democracy in Latin America; the continuing vitality of democ-
racy in the United States serves to buoy the hopes of those who struggle for 
democracy in Latin America. Were democracy to be eroded in the U.S., 
prospects for democracy in Latin America would be dimmed as well. 
We are not predicting the erosion of democracy in the United States. 
The country's changing place in the world economy is placing serious ten-
sions on democracy. But if there are structural limits there are also choices 
to be made within those constraints. Prediction would presuppose a de-
terministic methodology that denies the free action that genuine democracy 
entails. Methodological issues cannot be separated from substantive ones. 
Our aim, rather, is to direct research attention to the consequences for the 
U.S. of the changing international economic order, particularly the conse-
quences for democracy in the United States, and to insist that research must 
not only be refocused in certain substantive directions but also reoriented 
methodologically along the lines of the historical structural approach that 
characterizes many of the studies in the two volumes under review. 
The viability of democracy is a question that should be addressed from 
an international political-economy perspective-from a perspective that at-
tends to how the dynamics of capitalism in a particular context alter the 
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conditions that make democracy more and less possible. In Latin America, 
as the Collier volume shows, the dynamics of capitalism are seen on a global 
scale; the contributions to the Fagen volume begin to address the political 
economy of the United States in the same manner. What is needed now is 
research that attends to the problems thrown up for U.S.-based actors by the 
changing role of the United States in the world capitalist system; that attends 
to the opportunities and the constraints on key actors which emanate from 
these changes; that attends to the political programs which they seek to 
carry forward; and that attends to the consequences of these for democracy 
in the United States. 
